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Abstract 
We sought to investigate situation specific inflated sense of responsibility and explanatory style 
in social anxiety disorder (SAD) according to Clark and Wells’ cognitive model. Participants 
aged 17 - 68 years (M =31.9 SD = 11.1) included waiting list patients referred to a primary care 
mental health service for CBT for SAD (n = 18); and non-anxious control participants (n = 65).  
A battery of psychometric measures, including a bespoke measure of responsibility beliefs, was 
used. Compared with controls, participants with SAD were more likely to demonstrate an 
inflated sense of responsibility (p = ≤0.001), and to adopt a negative explanatory style specific to 
social interaction (p = <0.01). Inflated sense of responsibility was found to correlate with SAD 
symptomatology (r = 0.47  p = <0.05), and with increased usage of safety behaviours (r = 0.47  p 
= <0.05). Caseness (β = 1.45 p = <0.01) and stability of causal attribution (β = 0.25 p = ≤0.001) 
were found to predict inflated responsibility in our sample. To our knowledge this study 
represents the first attempt to investigate inflated responsibility within the context of SAD. Our 
results support the notion of inflated responsibility as a feature of SAD. 
Learning objectives: 
 To understand the cognitive-behavioural components of Clark and Wells’ model of SAD, 
and their bidirectional nature 
 To understand what the term ‘inflated sense of responsibility’ refers to, and how it relates 
to CBT 
 To understand what the term ‘explanatory style’ refers to, and how this concept can also 
relate to CBT 
Background 
The clinical term social anxiety disorder (SAD) is used to describe pathological anxiety 
characterized by an excessive fear of scrutiny from others, and avoidance of social interaction 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). SAD can follow a chronic and pernicious course 
resulting in significant functional impairment in terms of education, employment and in forming 
and maintaining meaningful relationships (Van Ameringen, Mancini, & Farvolden 2003; Grant 
et al., 2005; Greca & Lopez, 1998; Bruce et al., 2005; Kessler, Berglund, Demler, Jin & Walters, 
2005). Despite being a common psychological complaint, SAD is often left undiagnosed and 
untreated (Fink et al., 2009). 
In the UK, and in many other healthcare systems around the world, CBT is a first line therapy for 
SAD. Although CBT is an effective treatment for social anxiety, attrition ranges from 10-20% 
(Swift & Greenberg, 2014; Fernandez, Salem, Swift, & Ramtahal, 2015) and response rates are 
often less than 50% (Loerinc et al., 2015). However, estimates vary greatly, and response rates of 
84-85% have been reported using Clark and Wells’ (1995) model of CBT for social anxiety 
(Clark et al., 2006; Yoshinaga et al., 2016). Clark and Well’s model has been found to be an 
effective model for delivering CBT, and is widely utilized in the UK (Clark et al., 2003; 
Mortberg, Clark, Sundin & Wistedt, 2007). We chose to conceptualize and measure SAD in 
reference to Clark and Wells’ cognitive model so that any findings of interest may be translatable 
in to practice. Clark and Wells’ posit that pathological social anxiety develops from negative 
schemata regarding the self and others, and is maintained by four interrelated and bidirectional 
cognitive-behavioural processes. These processes include: excessive self-focused attention 
towards internally generated information (such as sensations of nausea or heart palpitations); 
negatively biased mental representations of one’s outward appearance as it is thought to be 
perceived by others; utilization of maladaptive safety behaviours; and excessive worry and 
rumination related to social interaction events. The presentation is theorized as arising from 
negative core beliefs which underpin intermediate level assumptions about the self and others, 
resulting in an exaggerated fear of social rejection and the rendering of others as phobic objects. 
See figure 1 for an illustrative example of the model with example cognitive, behavioural and 
somatic symptoms and characteristics.  
(Figure 1 Adapted from Clark and Wells (1995) goes here) 
From an attribution theory perspective, SAD is associated with negative explanatory style 
(Arkin, Appleman & Burger, 1980; Stopa & Clark, 1993; Teglasi & Fagan, 1984). Explanatory 
style refers to how people tend to attribute causation for outcomes to situations or events along a 
set of dimensions related to their own and other’s agency. Causation can be perceived as being 
negative or positive (Wiener, 1986). Psychologically healthy people tend to operate a positive 
explanatory style, sometimes dubbed a ‘self-serving bias’. When a positive explanatory style is 
adopted, outcomes perceived as being good are attributed to internal, stable and controllable 
causes; and bad outcomes are attributed to external, unstable and uncontrollable causes. For 
example, one might make sense of a good exam result as being due to their own intelligence and 
hard work; and make sense of failing an exam by attributing their poor performance to the 
‘wrong’ questions being set for the exam paper. When a negative attributional style is adopted, 
causation is attributed opposingly, so that good outcomes are perceived as external, unstable and 
uncontrollable; and poor outcomes as internal, stable and controllable: implying greater personal 
responsibility for poor outcomes and less responsibility for good outcomes. For example, a 
socially anxious person might enter in to a conversation with a stranger, selectively attending to 
threat related cues, becoming highly aware of potentially critical statements or evidence of lack 
of rapport (such as failing to elicit laughter with a joke). They may then decide the conversation 
had a poor outcome (e.g. they felt rejected and embarrassed), and that the reasons for this were 
internal (a result of their own actions), stable (due to their own innate lack of social ability which 
may be related to a core belief such as being ‘useless’ or ‘different’), and controllable (that is, it 
is within their power to employ safety seeking behaviours to avoid poor outcomes such as this). 
Inflated responsibility refers to the inclination to readily and excessively accept personal 
responsibility for actual or potential events which the majority of people are likely to deem 
separate and independent from themselves. First described and measured within the context of 
obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD), Salkovskis et al. (2000) describes inflated responsibility 
as “the belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent subjectively crucial 
negative outcomes. These outcomes are perceived as essential to prevent. They may be actual, 
that is, having consequences in the real world, and/or at a moral level” (pp.350). Inflated 
responsibility is considered characteristic of OCD and has been well researched in this context. 
However, there are data to suggest that inflated responsibility may be a transdiagnostic feature of 
anxiety disorder (Pozza & Dettore, 2014a; Startup & Davey, 2003). Pozza& Dettore (2014b) 
conducted a comprehensive meta-analysis of the available evidence, and found that, depending 
on the psychometric measures being employed, responsibility was not more strongly associated 
with OCD over anxiety and depression.  In the lead author’s clinical experience, fear related 
cognitions elicited during CBT for social anxiety describe a fear of embarrassment or 
humiliation directly attributed to the patient’s own actions e.g. “I will say something stupid”. The 
authors hypothesized that patients experiencing social anxiety are prone to fear aversive 
outcomes which arise as a result of their own actions because, to some unknown degree, they are 
predisposed to accept personal responsibility for these outcomes. 
The purposes of this study were 1) to establish to what extent SAD participants exhibited an 
inflated sense of responsibility specific to social interaction situations compared to non-anxious 
control participants; and 2) if a propensity for inflated responsibility were apparent, to establish 
if a relationship existed between this inflated responsibility and other features of SAD including 
worry, rumination, use of safety behaviours, self-focussed attention and severity of symptoms .  
Methods 
Participants 
We recruited 18 patients awaiting CBT for SAD from the waiting list of a primary care mental 
health service in the UK to act as cases. Patients who were 18 years or older and had received a 
GP referral to the service for therapy to manage pathological social anxiety. Patients with a 
previous or current diagnosis of OCD or other co-morbid condition that may be causative of 
social anxiety symptoms (such as panic disorder or PTSD) were excluded.  
To act as controls, we recruited 65 healthy individuals from the general public via online 
advertisements. This was slightly less than the 72 participants needed for a 4:1 allocation ratio, 
optimal to boost statistical power in case-control studies (Dos Santos Silva, 1999). Inclusion was 
dependent on potential participants completing the ultra-brief four item Patient Health 
Questionnaire screening measure (PHQ-4; (Kroenke, Spitzer, Williams & Löwe, 2009) 
consisting of a two item depression scale and a two item generalised anxiety scale. Potential 
participants scoring higher than the recognised healthy population mean for the screening 
measure were excluded and presented with a message explaining why, and advising them to 
speak to their GP if they felt they could benefit from help with anxiety or low mood. The 
measure has demonstrated good reliability and validity in terms of total item correlations (r = 
0.62), internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78) and convergence with similar, more 
comprehensive measures (Löwe et al. 2010). 
Waiting list patients eligible to participate were given an information leaflet regarding the study 
at their initial assessment appointment. These patients were asked if they would be willing to be 
contacted by telephone at a later date to discuss possible participation in the study. Those who 
agreed were contacted by the lead author to answer any queries about the study, and to confirm 
consent to participate. Ethical approval for the study was given by Wales Rec 7 Research Ethics 
Committee (15/WA/0117). Cambridge and Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust gave site-
specific approval, and approval was given by the University of Oxford as study sponsor. In cases 
where consent was obtained, the participant was sent a secure web link to access the study 
questionnaires, or offered an appointment to complete the questionnaires at the practice if they 
were unable to access the internet at home. However, no participants were unable to access the 
internet at home.   
Control group participants were recruited using online advertisements placed on social media 
and local news websites, and offered entry in to a raffle for a £50 online shopping voucher. 
Participants found to be eligible following completion of the brief screening measure completed 
the SRAS and CDS-II questionnaires via secure web link. 
Both groups provided demographic information (age and gender). Cases provided information of 
current medication usage, and control group participants who wished to enter the raffle provided 
an email address. This data was held securely in an encrypted folder on a password protected 
computer at the practice. No identifiable information such as name, address, or date of birth were 
sought from participants in either group. 
Materials and Procedures 
Self-Report Measures 
To measure inflated responsibility specific to social interaction we developed the Social 
Responsibility Attitudes Scale (SRAS). The SRAS is based upon the original Responsibility 
Attitudes Scale (RAS), developed by Salkovskis and colleagues (2000). The original RAS was 
designed to measure perceived sense of responsibility in general terms. Both the RAS and the 
SRAS are comprised of 26 items, each of which are answered along a 7 point Likert scale 
allowing for a possible minimum numerical score of 26 and a maximum of 182, representing 
lower and higher perceived responsibility. SRAS items were contextually altered so that they 
could be applied only to social interaction situations rather than a multitude of general situations. 
For example, the first item of the original RAS would read as “I often feel responsible for things 
which go wrong”, whilst the SRAS reads “I often feel responsible for things which go wrong 
during social interactions”. We found that the SRAS demonstrated internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.95) greater than that of the original RAS (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.90 - 
0.92) (Mather & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004; Salkovskis et al., 2000), likely due to the increased 
specificity of the concept being measured. 
The Causal Dimensions Scale (Revised) (CDS-II) (McAuley, Duncan & Russell, 1992) was used 
to measure explanatory style. The CDS-II is a situation specific measure of explanatory style in 
accordance with Weiner’s (1985) theory of causal attribution. Prior to completing the CDS-II, 
participants are asked to recall a specific situation or event to complete the measure in reference 
to. For the purposes of our study we asked participants to recall a social interaction situation 
perceived to have had a poor outcome leading to embarrassment, humiliation or rejection felt by 
themselves or others. The measure consists of 12 items along four subscales. Each subscale 
pertains to a domain of perceived causality: locus of causality as being perceived as internal or 
external; perceived degree of personal control over outcomes; enduring stability of causal 
attribution; and perceived degree of external control over outcomes.  Each item is anchored by 
two opposing statements related to the outcome of the reference situation or event, and are 
separated by a numerical scale used to denote agreement. For the purposes of the study we 
inverted the scoring of the personal control subscale, so that a higher total score represented an 
increasingly negative explanatory style and a lower score a positive explanatory style. In terms 
of reliability, average internal consistency across all subscales of the CDS-II (as calculated using 
Cronbach’s alpha coefficient) has been found to range from the lower end of acceptable (locus of 
causality, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67, stability, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.67), to good (personal 
control, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.79, external control, Cronbach’s alpha = 0.82) (Boisvert & Faust, 
1999). Based on factor analysis carried out by Watkins, Sachs & Regmi (1997) and Crocker, 
Eklund & Graham (2002), the external control subscale was dropped for this study in order to 
increase internal consistency across subscales. 
To measure symptom severity the Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al. 2000). The SPIN 
is a widely used measure which forms part of the IAPT (Improving Access to Psychological 
Therapies) minimum dataset used in NHS organisations in England. The SPIN consists of 17 
items along 3 subscales, each using a 5 point Likert scale to denote agreement with statements 
related to fear, avoidance and physiological symptoms of SAD. The SPIN has been found to 
demonstrate good test-retest reliability (r = 0.78 - 0.89) and internal consistency (Cronbach’s 
alpha = 0.82 - 0.92) (Antony, Coons, McCabe, Ashbaugh, & Swinson, 2006; Connor et al., 
2000). A cut off score of 19 (out of a total of 72) is recognised as a reliable predictor of SAD. 
We employed a battery of self-report tools to measure the cognitive-behavioural processes 
through to characterise SAD according to Clark and Wells' model (Clark & Wells, 1995 cited in 
Heimberg et al., 1995). The Anticipatory Processing Questionnaire (APQ) (Vassilopoulos, 2004) 
was used to measure anticipatory anxiety prior to engagement in social situations. The APQ 
consists of 18 items, each answered using a visual analogue scale to denote agreement with 
opposing statements related to anticipatory anxiety prior to social interaction situations. A total 
score for each individual item (excluding item 17 which requires a yes/no answer) represents 
lower or higher anticipatory anxiety. The APQ has been found to demonstrate good internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91) (Vassilopoulos 2004).  
The Post-Event Processing Questionnaire (Revised) (PEPQ-R) (McEvoy & Kingsep, 2006) was 
used to measure negatively valenced ruminative thought following engagement in social 
situations. The PEPQ-R consists of 13 items each answered using a visual analogue scale to 
denote agreement with opposing statements regarding ruminative thought related to social 
interaction situations. The PEPQ-R has been found to exhibit good internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = 0.89 - 0.90) (Brozovich & Heimberg, 2011; McEvoy & Kingsep 2006). 
The Self Focussed Attention (SFA) (Bogel, Albert, & Jong, 1996) scale was used to measure 
degree of inwardly focussed attention. Each of the SFA’s 11 items are answered using a 
numerical scale to denote agreement with a statement related to self focussed attention along two 
subscales of autonomic arousal and behavioural indicators of inwardly focussed attention. The 
SFA has been found to demonstrate good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78 - 0.86) 
(Bogels et al. 1996). 
Finally, the Subtle Avoidance Frequency Examination (SAFE) (Cuming et al., 2009) was used to 
measure frequency of overt and covert safety seeking behaviour. The SAFE is comprised of 32 
items, answered using a 5 point Likert scale to denote the frequency with which respondents 
engage in safety seeking behaviours prior to and during social interaction situations. The 
measure has been found to demonstrate good internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91) 
(Cuming et al., 2009). 
Results 
Descriptive statistics 
Descriptive data and between group differences including t-value and effect size (Cohen’s d) for 
cases and control participants are presented in table 1. Median SRAS, CDS-II, and CDS-II locus 
of causality and stability subscale scores were significantly higher for cases than for control 
group participants. There was no significant difference in age between the two groups, but the 
control group had significant gender imbalance (85% female). 
(table 1 goes here) 
Median scores for psychometric measures specific to social anxiety presentation are presented in 
table 3.  
Correlation analysis 
Pearson’s product moment correlation was carried out using case group participant’s data, and 
included demographic variables and psychometric test scores. The results are presented in table 
2. A higher SRAS score was found to be correlated with higher SPIN and SAFE scores; and 
female gender was found to correlate with higher SRAS and SFA scores.  
(table 2 goes here) 
Regression analysis 
Ordinal logistic regression was carried out to find predictors of higher SRAS scores for all 
participants after controlling for age and gender. ‘Group’ was assigned as a binary factor with the 
control group as the reference category. SRAS scores were square root transformed prior to 
regression analysis, as although the dataset could be considered normally distributed, the 
distribution did exhibit some skewness (-0.19) and kurtosis (2.12). Regression coefficients are 
presented in table 3.  
Caseness was found to be a significant predictor of higher SRAS score, as was higher CDS-II 
stability subscale score. CDS-II personal control subscale scores did not differ significantly 
between groups and were omitted from regression analysis to avoid hyper-collinearity. 
(table 3 goes here) 
(table 4 goes here) 
Discussion 
We found that cases scored significantly higher on a measure of inflated responsibility specific to 
social interaction compared to healthy control participants. Furthermore this measure exhibited 
good internal consistency and correlated will with an existing and well validated measure of 
social anxiety symptomatology. Inflated sense of responsibility specific to social interaction 
correlated highly with social anxiety symptomatology, and with usage of safety seeking 
behaviours. We also found statistically significant positive correlations between female gender, 
inflated responsibility and self-focussed attention. At regression analysis, caseness was found to 
be a significant predictor of inflated sense of responsibility specific to social interaction. 
Although more rigorous validation is needed, these data suggest that the SRAS is measuring 
what it is designed to measure, and that inflated sense of responsibility specific to social 
interaction is associated with SAD.   
Cases reported an increasingly negative explanatory style within the context of social interaction 
situations compared to controls. Regression analysis suggested that stability of causal attribution 
- but not overall negativity of explanatory style nor externality or internality of locus of control - 
predicted inflated responsibility. These results suggest that an inability to consider different 
potential causes for poor outcomes contributes to social anxiety symptoms. e.g. the patient may 
not have sufficient cognitive flexibility to view an awkward date as being due to a lack of shared 
interests, as opposed to being due to a lack of social skills on their part – therefore accepting 
responsibility for the poor outcome. Based on these findings it would appear that an emphasis on 
cognitive restructuring with a view to increase cognitive flexibility by encouraging the patient to 
entertain a range of different possible causations would be beneficial. Techniques such as the 
‘responsibility pie’ (Veale, 1999) could be a useful tool to this end, as could the inclusion of 
compassion-focussed therapy techniques to reduce self-blame and self-criticism (Gilbert, 2009). 
Please see figure 2 for an illustrative example of how this approach might fit in to the existing 
Clark and Wells (1995) model. 
(Figure 2 goes here.) 
Our study suffered from a lack of a structured diagnostic interview to define caseness, which 
may have had a deleterious effect on the validity of our results; though all cases scored 
significantly higher than the recognised cut-off of 19/72 indicating SAD when completing the 
SPIN measure. As patients were on a waiting list, there is a possibility that an undiagnosed co-
morbid problem such as OCD or GAD may have contributed to inflated responsibility in one or 
more cases. The study was limited by a sample of cases, and an insufficiently matched control 
group. Though our results lack sufficient power to confidently assert clear between group 
differences in inflated responsibility and explanatory style, these data do highlight the need for 
further study.  
Future research should involve clinical participants and assess whether a tendency to accept 
excessive moral responsibility for outcomes associated with social interaction contributes to 
social anxiety presentation, and to what degree. The ramifications for cognitive-behavioural case 
formulation should also be investigated. For example, it may be advantageous to explore the role 
of maladaptive beliefs and attitudes related to inflated responsibility when working with SAD, 
and make use of techniques such as the responsibility pie to encourage cognitive change.  
Summary 
• Inflated sense of responsibility may form part of anxiety presentations other than OCD 
• When formulating SAD, inflated responsibility may be an underlying feature of the 
presentation 
• Inflexible thinking in making sense of outcomes to situations and events may play a role 
in SAD presentations 
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Table 1: Descriptive data and between group differences 
Variable Participant group 
Controls n = 65 SAD n = 18 t d 
Gender (% female) 84.62% 67.86% - - 
Age  
Mean (SD) 
32.74 (11.32) 30.07 (10.47) -1.07  
p = 0.29 
d = 0.24 
SRAS Median (SD) 91 (32.96) 124 (23.26) 4.71 
p = 0.001 
d = 1.13 
CDS- II Median (SD) 46 (11.57) 54.5 (9.54) 2.78 
p = 0.007 
d = 0.63 
CDS-II 
Sub-scales 
 
 
LOC 
Median 
(SD) 
18 (5.46) 
22 (5.23) 2.75 
p = 0.007 
d = 0.62 
Personal 
Control 
Median 
(SD) 
16 (5.72) 18 (6.86) 0.34 
p = 0.73 
d = 0.07 
Stability 
Median 
(SD) 
11 (5.4) 16 (3.7) 2.9 
p = 0.005 
d = 0.68 
(SD)=Standard Deviation; SPIN=Social Phobia Inventory; SRAS=Social Responsibility Attitudes 
Scale; CDS-II=Causal Dimension Scale; LOC=Locus of Control 
Table 2: Regression coefficients for demographic and psychometric variables 
Predictor Variables All Participants 
n = 83 
 β SE t p 
Group* 1.45 
 
0.46 3.14 0.002 
CDS-II LOC 0.03 0.05 0.62 0.54 
CDS-II Stability 0.25 
 
0.05 4.55 0.001 
CDS-II Total -0.006 0.03 -0.21 0.84 
*Control group used as reference category. CDS-II = Causal Dimension Scale 2nd Revision; LOC = 
Locus of Control; PC = Personal Control. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics for cases (n = 18) 
 Age* SPIN SRAS APQ SFA SAFE PEPQ-
R 
M 30.07 52 136.5 121.5 35 104.5 75.5 
SD 10.47 10.29 16.3 15.98 6.72 17.44 23.22 
Range 17-
53 
35-
67 
110-
166 
82-
140 
23-
44 
66-
131 
9-131 
M=Median Average (Mean Average for Age*); SD=Standard Deviation. SPIN = Social Phobia 
Inventory; SRAS = Social Responsibility Attitudes Scale, APQ = Anticipatory Processing 
Questionnaire; SFA = Self-Focussed Attention scale; SAFE = Subtle Avoidance Frequency 
Examination; PEPQ-R = Post-Event Processing Questionnaire-Revised. 
 
Table 4: Pearsons’s product moment correlation 1 
 Age Gender Meds SPIN SRAS APQ SFA SAFE PEPQ-R 
Age  -0.09 0.10 0.41 0.13 0.21 -0.02 0.09 -0.39 
Gender* -0.09  -0.08 0.25 0.60** 0.18 0.48* 0.24 0.15 
Meds** 0.10 -0.08  -0.22 0.34 0.17 -0.06 0.25 0.34 
SPIN 0.41 0.25 -0.22  0.47* 0.14 0.14 0.20 -0.23 
SRAS 0.13 0.60** 0.34 0.47*  0.32 0.19 0.47* 0.09 
APQ 0.21 0.18 0.17 0.14 0.32  0.08 0.24 0.41 
SFA -0.02 0.48* -0.06 0.14 0.19 0.08  0.29 -0.07 
SAFE 0.09 0.24 0.25 0.20 0.47* 0.24 0.29  -0.11 
PEPQ-R -0.39 0.15 0.34 -0.23 0.09 0.41 -0.07 0.11  
*Gender 1= Female;** Meds 1 = currently using prescribed anti-anxiety medication. SPIN = Social 2 
Phobia Inventory; SRAS = Social Responsibility Attitudes Scale, APQ = Anticipatory Processing 3 
Questionnaire; SFA = Self-Focussed Attention scale; SAFE = Subtle Avoidance Frequency 4 
Examination; PEPQ-R = Post-Event Processing Questionnaire-Revised.  5 
*p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 6 
